Korea and Japan Set to Support Hormuz Strait Mission Without Troop Deployment

Analysts say it will be difficult for South Korea or Japan to completely reject President Donald Trump’s call for deployment to the Hormuz Strait, and both countries are likely to offer some form of contribution even if not sending direct combat troops. The discussion comes as U.S.-Japan–Korea security dynamics are under renewed scrutiny ahead of a White House meeting between the United States and Japan.

Jack Cooper, a senior fellow at the American Enterprise Institute, described the debate on a Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) podcast. He said that given Trump’s pressure for deployments, it is not realistic to expect either Korea or Japan to simply say no. Cooper suggested the two alliances will ultimately have to answer with some form of “Yes,” though he cautioned that Japan is unlikely to dispatch mine-countermeasure ships.

210505-N-KC128-0057 NAVAL SUPPORT ACTIVITY BAHRAIN (May 5, 2021) Sailors stand at attention during a change of command ceremony for U.S. Naval Forces Central Command (NAVCENT), U.S. 5th Fleet and Combined Maritime Forces (CMF) onboard Naval Support Activity Bahrain, May 5. Vice Adm. Sam Paparo was relieved by Vice Adm. Brad Cooper. NAVCENT is the U.S Navy element of U.S. Central Command in the U.S. 5th Fleet area of operations and encompasses about 2.5 million square miles of water area and includes the Arabian Gulf, Gulf of Oman, Red Sea and parts of the Indian Ocean. The expanse is comprised of 20 countries and includes three critical choke points at the Strait of Hormuz, the Suez Canal and the Strait of Bab al Mandeb at the southern tip of Yemen. (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 1st Class Daniel Hinton)
Representative image for context; not directly related to the specific event in this article. License: Public domain. Source: Wikimedia Commons.

Cooper argued that, in a broader international context, many European allies have already indicated reluctance to participate, pushing Korea and Japan to seek a middle ground that reduces direct confrontation with Iran while still supporting the United States. He noted that indirect contributions—such as operational support in the Indian Ocean for fuel resupply or other logistical roles—could be considered as feasible options.

At the same time, Cooper acknowledged the political risks for Seoul and Tokyo. With U.S. forces already deployed in Korea and Japan, shifting personnel or capabilities to the Middle East would carry significant domestic political costs, making any decision a delicate balancing act for both governments.

Kristi Gobella, a senior adviser at CSIS, weighed in on the upcoming U.S.–Japan summit at the White House. She said the Iran crisis has shifted the summit’s focus toward alliance contributions, and that the meeting will serve as a practical test of alliance “loyalty.” For Washington, the question is what Japan can realistically contribute in a way that aligns with domestic politics and regional security goals.

210505-N-KC128-0079 NAVAL SUPPORT ACTIVITY BAHRAIN (May 5, 2021) Vice Adm. Brad Cooper salutes during a change of command ceremony for U.S. Naval Forces Central Command (NAVCENT), U.S. 5th Fleet and Combined Maritime Forces (CMF) onboard Naval Support Activity Bahrain, May 5. Vice Adm. Sam Paparo was relieved by Cooper. NAVCENT is the U.S. Navy element of U.S. Central Command in the U.S. 5th Fleet area of operations and encompasses about 2.5 million square miles of water area and includes the Arabian Gulf, Gulf of Oman, Red Sea and parts of the Indian Ocean. The expanse is comprised of 20 countries and includes three critical choke points at the Strait of Hormuz, the Suez Canal and the Strait of Bab al Mandeb at the southern tip of Yemen. (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 1st Class Daniel Hinton)
Representative image for context; not directly related to the specific event in this article. License: Public domain. Source: Wikimedia Commons.

Gobella described possible concrete measures Korea and Japan might consider. She mentioned engagement with the United States’ next-generation missile defense system, known as Golden Dome, as a potential area of participation, as well as production support to replenish missiles depleted in conflict. Such options would allow allies to bolster U.S. defense architecture without fully committing large-scale ground forces.

For U.S. readers, the issue matters beyond Korea because Hormuz is a critical chokepoint in global energy trade, linking the Persian Gulf to the Indian Ocean. Allied contributions could influence global oil prices, supply-chain stability, and the broader U.S. security posture in the Indo-Pacific. Analysts warn that if American credibility on security commitments is undermined, Southeast Asian countries might seek closer ties with China, affecting the trajectory of U.S. policy and regional balance.

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